EU Law Radar

Monitoring References to the Court of Justice of the European Union

Case C-505/26, GlovoApp23 – the algorithm that remembers who said no

C-505/26pendingCURIA ↗EUR-Lex ↗

A courier who is free to say no, but whose every refusal is remembered by the algorithm that allocates tomorrow’s work, may not be as free as the contract says. The Audiencia Nacional asks the Court of Justice how to tell.

Facts

GlovoApp23, S.A. is in proceedings against the Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social, the Spanish social security treasury, before the Audiencia Nacional. The questions describe couriers who may accept or reject jobs and choose when to connect and disconnect, but whose rejections and disconnections at times of peak demand are recorded by an automated scoring system. Because of that system, they are placed later in the order in which access to future work slots is given. The couriers may not use subcontractors or substitutes. According to the first question, that restriction comes not from Glovo but from the Spanish legislation on economically dependent self-employed workers. They are also free to work for competing platforms at the same time, on the same routes. The court asks whether, under the concept of “worker” in Article 2(1) of the Working Time Directive, such couriers are workers and their connected time is working time.

Questions Referred

1. Must Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time], in light of the independent concept of ‘worker’ in EU law, be interpreted as precluding the classification of an individual as an independent service provider simply because he or she is not entitled to make use of subcontractors or substitutes to perform the service, in those cases where that restriction does not arise from an instruction or the control of the digital platform, or from a contractual requirement, but rather from mandatory compliance with a prohibition established in the national legislation applicable to the trading arrangements under which the service provider operates (economically dependent self-employed worker)?

2. Must the concept of ‘worker’ for the purposes of Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC be interpreted as meaning that the independence of a service provider becomes fictitious, resulting in a power of management and control comparable to a relationship of subordination, where – in spite of the service provider being physically free to accept or reject jobs and to choose when to connect and disconnect – the digital platform implements an automated scoring or assessment system which records the rejection of jobs and disconnection at times of peak demand and, as an algorithmic consequence of that, relegates that service provider in the time order in which access is provided to the system for reserving future work time slots, indirectly conditioning his or her prospective ability to generate income?

3. In the event that the system of algorithmic prioritisation described in the preceding question is considered a valid indication of subordination: Must the concept of ‘working time’, provided for in Article 2(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC, be interpreted as meaning that it precludes the classification of [a situation as] an employment relationship (regarding the periods of connection to the application as time at the platform’s disposal) in those cases where the national court factually establishes the concurrence of the following circumstances: (a) The service provider is not subject to any form of exclusivity agreement. (b) The service provider, without incurring any disciplinary penalisation, physically exercises the right to provide logistics services, concurrently, for the platforms of direct competitors (multi-apping). (c) That simultaneous provision of services for third parties takes place during the same time slots in which the service provider is connected and even sharing the same delivery routes, without being subject to any form of exclusivity agreement?

Comment

The questions are built on Yodel (C‑692/19), the leading ruling on whether a platform-style courier is a worker under the Working Time Directive. That order of 2020 held that the Directive precludes treating a self-employed courier as a worker where he has discretion to use subcontractors or substitutes, to accept or refuse tasks, to work for competitors and to fix his own hours. That holds “provided that, first, the independence of that person does not appear to be fictitious and, second, it is not possible to establish the existence of a relationship of subordination”. The Audiencia Nacional’s three questions take those indicators one by one.

The first concerns substitution. In Yodel the right to use substitutes pointed towards independence. Here the couriers lack that right, but only because Spanish law forbids it to anyone with their status. The court asks whether an indicator of subordination still counts when the platform did not impose it. If what matters is the reality of the relationship, the absence of substitution counts whatever its source. If what matters is the control the platform exercises, it may count for little.

The second question is the novel one. The couriers are formally free to refuse work and to log off, which in Yodel pointed towards independence. But an algorithm records refusals at peak times and moves the courier down the queue for future slots. Freedom exercised at a cost to future income may be the kind of independence that “does not appear” genuine. The third question asks whether working for rival platforms on the same routes at the same time prevents connected time from being working time even if the courier is a worker.

The context has moved since 2020. The Platform Work Directive, which Member States must transpose by 2 December 2026, requires a “legally presumed” employment relationship where facts indicating “direction and control” are found, “with consideration to the case-law of the Court of Justice”. The answer here will be part of that case law.

Sources

OJ notice C/2026/5877 (EUR‑Lex) · Case file on CURIA · Yodel, C‑692/19 (ECLI:EU:C:2020:288) · Directive 2003/88/EC · Directive (EU) 2024/2831