Case C-446/26, Blerens – who reviews a prosecutor's European arrest warrant?
The European arrest warrant system rests on a promise the Court calls the “dual level of protection”: somewhere before surrender, a judge must have looked at the case. But what if each of the two levels assumes the other one did the looking?
Facts
The Rechtbank Amsterdam — the busiest EAW-executing court in the Union — is asked to surrender RI under a European arrest warrant issued by a public prosecutor, for the purpose of criminal prosecution and, in addition, the execution of custodial sentences. The prosecutor qualifies as an “issuing judicial authority” within the meaning of the Framework Decision, but the decision to issue the EAW is not subject to judicial review in the issuing State before surrender. The underlying national arrest warrant was issued by a judge — who, however, never assessed the conditions for issuing an EAW, its proportionality in particular, and whose decision is likewise unreviewable before surrender. The Openbaar Ministerie is the other party to the proceedings. (Blerens is a fictitious case name assigned under the Court’s anonymisation practice.)
Questions Referred
According to the Official Journal notice, the Rechtbank Amsterdam asks:
Must Article 8(1)(c) of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, be interpreted as meaning that the requirements inherent in the effective judicial protection to which a person against whom a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purpose of criminal prosecution – and, in addition, for the purpose of the execution of custodial sentences – must enjoy are not met if:
1. the European arrest warrant has been issued by a public prosecutor – who can be regarded as the ‘issuing judicial authority’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) of that framework decision – whose decision to issue that European arrest warrant is not subject to judicial review in the issuing Member State prior to the surrender of the requested person, whereas
2. that European arrest warrant, in so far as it relates to criminal proceedings, is based on a national arrest warrant issued by a judge who, when issuing that warrant, did not assess the conditions for issuing an EAW – the proportionality thereof in particular – and whose decision is not subject to such judicial review in the issuing Member State prior to the surrender of the requested person?
Sources
OJ notice C/2026/3402 (EUR‑Lex) · Case file on CURIA · Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA · Order of 2 July 2026, ECLI:EU:C:2026:551 (EUR‑Lex)
Outcome. Heard under the urgent procedure and answered on 2 July 2026 by reasoned order under Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure (Fifth Chamber, ECLI:EU:C:2026:551) — that is, the Court considered the answer clearly deducible from existing case law. It chose substance over form in only one direction: the requirements of effective judicial protection are satisfied even though the prosecutor’s decision to issue the EAW cannot be challenged before surrender, and even though the national warrant underlying the prosecution limb was issued by a judge who examined neither the conditions for issuing an EAW nor its proportionality — provided that, after surrender, a judicial remedy in the issuing State reviews those conditions, including proportionality. The “dual level of protection” thus survives as a guarantee that review will happen, not that it will happen before the person is handed over. The order exists in Dutch, French and German only; the authentic Dutch operative part follows, and the rendering above is this site’s.
Het Hof (Vijfde kamer) beschikt: Artikel 8, lid 1, onder c), van kaderbesluit 2002/584/JBZ van de Raad van 13 juni 2002 betreffende het Europees aanhoudingsbevel en de procedures van overlevering tussen de lidstaten, gelezen in het licht van artikel 47 van het Handvest van de grondrechten van de Europese Unie, moet aldus worden uitgelegd dat wanneer een openbaar aanklager die een „uitvaardigende rechterlijke autoriteit“ in de zin van artikel 6, lid 1, van dit kaderbesluit is, een Europees aanhoudingsbevel heeft uitgevaardigd met het oog op strafvervolging en de tenuitvoerlegging van vrijheidsstraffen, er voldaan is aan de vereisten die inherent zijn aan de effectieve rechterlijke bescherming die de gezochte persoon moet kunnen genieten, ook al staat er in de uitvaardigende lidstaat vóór de overlevering van die persoon geen beroep in rechte open tegen de beslissing van die openbaar aanklager tot uitvaardiging van dat Europees aanhoudingsbevel en ook al berust het vervolgingsgedeelte van dat Europees aanhoudingsbevel op een nationaal aanhoudingsbevel dat werd uitgevaardigd door een rechter die geen toetsing van de voorwaarden voor de uitvaardiging van een Europees aanhoudingsbevel en met name van de evenredigheid ervan heeft verricht en wiens beslissing evenmin vatbaar is voor beroep vóór de overlevering, op voorwaarde dat er in de uitvaardigende lidstaat na de overlevering beroep in rechte mogelijk is waarbij de voorwaarden voor de uitvaardiging van het Europees aanhoudingsbevel en met name de evenredigheid ervan worden getoetst.
Comment
The reference aims at the seam left by a decade of case law on who may sign a European arrest warrant and who checks them. The architecture was laid down step by step. In Case C‑241/15, Bob‑Dogi (ECLI:EU:C:2016:385) the Court held that an EAW must rest on a distinct national arrest warrant — the first of the two levels of protection. In Joined Cases C‑508/18 and C‑82/19 PPU, OG and PI (ECLI:EU:C:2019:456) it accepted prosecutors as “issuing judicial authorities” only where they are shielded from executive direction — a test German prosecutors failed, forcing Germany to reroute its warrants through courts, while the companion case on the Lithuanian Prosecutor General went the other way. And in Case C‑648/20 PPU, Svishtov (ECLI:EU:C:2021:187) — where prosecutors had issued both the national warrant and the EAW — the Court required that the conditions for issuing the EAW, including its proportionality, be open to effective judicial review in the issuing State before surrender.
Blerens presents the configuration those cases left open: a hybrid in which every box is formally ticked and yet, on the referring court’s account, nobody has ever examined the EAW itself. The national warrant is judicial, so Bob‑Dogi is satisfied on paper; but that judge looked only at national detention grounds, not at the EAW conditions or proportionality. The prosecutor did assess the EAW — but that assessment is unreviewable before surrender. If the “dual level of protection” means two substantive examinations rather than two signatures, this warrant arguably has zero; if formal judicial involvement at the first level suffices, Svishtov shrinks to its prosecutor-only facts. The Court will have to say which it is — form or substance.
Two further wrinkles are worth watching. The warrant serves a mixed purpose — prosecution and execution of custodial sentences — and the two limbs have different first-level anchors (an arrest warrant for one, an enforceable judgment for the other), so the answer may split. And because Amsterdam is the default executing forum for a large share of European surrenders, whatever standard emerges will propagate through the system at Dutch docket speed. Given that the requested person is typically detained in such cases, expect the urgent preliminary-ruling procedure and a fast answer.